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In this article Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Wennergren have summarized
the evolution of public land policy in the United States and have revealed how and why past policy decisions are highly relevant to the
present efforts of the federal agencies of the Public Land Law Review
Commission. The main issues discussed center around grazing fee
regulations.

PUBLIC POLICY AND GRAZING FEES
ON FEDERAL LANDS: SOME
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
DarwinB. Nielsen*
E. Boyd Wennergren**

B

EGINNING with the early debates to protect the forests,
public land policy has not had a quiet history. Its evolution has often been catalyzed by heated debates, both public
and private. In part, the problems can be traced to overlapping divisions of responsibilities. Congress, the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Land Management in the Department of Interior have all
at one time or another established or strongly influenced
public land policies. Recently, the Bureau of the Budget has
exerted an increasing influence, especially in the matter of
user-charges or fees. The establishment of the Public
Land Law Review marked a particularly significant effort
to deal with present issues.

A major issue that has consistently pervaded public
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policy discussions has revolved around user-charges or fees.
The reason is obvious. User-fees represent an available
source of liquid wealth to society for the use of these resources, therefore the level of the fee is important. But determination of these fees has been complicated by changing
philosophical and legal concepts as well as by economic considerations. The philosophical concepts underlying the purposes or goals of public land usage have changed as the needs
of our nation have changed. Once settlement and development of our vast land resources were in the national interest.
Today we find intense, multiple competition for what has become a scarce resource. After encouraging settlement through
liberalized land disposal programs such as the Homestead
Act, we moved through an era where conservation and stability were emphasized. We are now confronting competition for
lands and a need for public revenues that seem to suggest a
new philosophy-collecting full economic value for all uses.
Fee levels and policies that were consistent with a liberalized
land use philosophy, seem in conflict with today's perceived
realities.
Instead of fairly straight forward economic question in
the transition to higher user-charges, however, the present
situation is confounded by the aggregate effects of past public land policy. Economic conditions established under these
past policies and unknowingly subjected to economic laws
by rationally motivated users have generated economic and
legal consequences of unforeseen magnitude.
In this paper we have tried to summarize the evolution
of public land policy in the United States and to focus upon
how and why past policy decisions are highly relevant to
present efforts of federal agencies and the Public Land Law
Review Commission. The focal issues will be related to questions of grazing fee regulations. Much of the federal land
endowment can be grazed, and its use for this purpose has a
long history. But perhaps more important, grazing fees have
been important to the historical evolution of public land policy. In a sense, the questions now being asked about the fees
exemplify the basic issues, and the historical interdependence
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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of economics and law as they relate to current public land issues.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC LAND GRAZING FEEs

Grazing fees for agricultural use of public lands were
initially assessed by the Forest Service in 1906.
The minimum fees for summer grazing were set
at 5 to 8 cents per head for the summer season for
sheep and 20 to 35 cents per head for cattle and
horses. The annual rate was 35 to 50 cents per head.
The regulations further provided that as the condition of the range improved and the demand for permits increased, the grazing charges would gradually
be increased.'
This action followed about twenty years of legislative
effort to launch a coherent public land policy. The first
comprehensive bill to reserve and protect forests on the public domain was unsuccessfully introduced in 1871. But the
following year the first withdrawal of land for public use
was made and Yellowstone Park was established. In 1891,
Congress gave the President power to establish forest reserves by proclamation, but this effort was ineffective because no means were provided for subsequent administration
of lands so designated. The Sundry Civil Appropriation
Act of 1897 reaffirmed the power of the President to create
reserves and defined the types of land that could be set aside.
No public forest reserve shall be established, except to improve and protect the forests within the
reservations, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flow, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities
of the citizens of the United States; but it is not the
purpose or intent of these provisions, or of the Act
providing for such reservations, to authorize the inclusion therein of land more valuable for the min1. Hearings on Grazing Fees on Public Lands Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1969).
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erals therein, or for agricultural purposes, than for
forests. .
It is interesting to note that at this early date agricultural uses and mineral uses were considered of value for the
public good. Shortly after the passage of this act, jurisdiction of the forest reserve was placed with the Department of
Agriculture and the first grazing fees were assessed. But
even with the imposition of grazing fees, Congress and the
Forest Service were primarily concerned with protection,
improvement, administration, and extension of the forest.
Although imposition of grazing fees on forest lands
raised fewer protests from user groups than one might expect, the authority of a governmental agency to charge for
public land use was eventually challenged in the courts. The
right was finally upheld by the Supreme Court when it
granted to the government the power to make rules and regulations for its own land (including the imposition of userfees) .'
The Forest Service attempted to operate under the concept of a "reasonable charge" in situations involving exclusive use of any resource on the forest reserve. But usercharges became a controversial issue in 1907. Estimates by
Pinchot, head of the Forest Service, projected self-sufficiency for the agency by 1912. Instead of gaining support for
the user-fee schedules proposed, his projections fanned some
of the first flames of controversy over the nature of public
land goals. "In general the tone of the debate was that the
purpose in creating the reserve land had been to protect the
forests, not to exploit them for revenue."' Congressional
opposition to user-charges was general and some of the questions posed are especially interesting relative to today's publie land issues: "is the federal government going into a
profit-making business? Is it the policy of the federal government to convert its control over forests, grazing lands,
coal mines, etc., into money making schemes?' ''
2.

PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 17 (1951)
as PEFFER].
B. United States v. Girmand, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
4. PE FEI, supra note 2, at 93.
5. 41 CONG. REc. 3188, 3199, 3200 (1906-7).
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In spite of the controversy over the so-called commercialization of the forest reserves and claims that user-charges
were an intrusion by the federal government into the field of
business, grazing fees increased by 50 percent between 1906
and 1916. However, such increases were generally justified
on the basis of need to cover rising administrative costs.
Grazing fees were never commensurate with comparable
private lease rates. A significant economic consequence of
this "pricing" policy that has had continual relevance to the
problems of public land management, became manifest
around 1916. In the early 1900's grazing permits (the authorization to use Forest lands) were first observed to have
value to the rancher over and above the fee charges by the
government, i.e., ranchers were willing to pay the fee plus
an additional amount to gain access to the permit. It was reported during that period: "the grazing privilege became so
valuable that it figured in sales contracts for lands adjacent
to the forest whose owners held grazing permits.''' Thus,
control of grazing privileges on forest lands has been valued
by ranchers as a capital asset for over 50 years.
Administrative Aspects
The first 10 years of experience in assessing grazing fees
on public forest lands established several facts. First, the
courts supported the government's right to make user-charges
on public lands. Second, fee levels were geared to offset the
administrative costs of managing the lands in the interest of
protection and preservation. Low grazing fees also furthered
the goal of encouraging settlement of the remote West. Consequently, grazing fees were less than comparable commercial
rates charged for private grazing lands. Third, control of
forest grazing acquired a capital asset value that was represented by the grazing permit.
From 1916 to the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in
1934 efforts were continued to establish a meaningful public
land policy. Pressures to increase fees were exerted by Congress and/or the Department of Agriculture and resisted
6. PEFFER, supra note 2, at 186.
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by user-groups. The 1920's produced considerable controversy, and study. The Rachford Report,7 completed in 1924
under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture, was
perhaps the most notable research of the period. It became
the focal point and basis for a revised fee system in the early
1930's.
The method of calculating grazing fees was
changed in 1931, based on studies of National Forest
grazing values conducted during the 1920's. Forage
quality, accessibility, water resources, proximity to
market and livestock handling costs were considered.
Basic premise of the study was that private land
data on range values, or rental rate on private rangelands could be used to determine the use value of
National Forest range. Base fees varied from area
to area, depending on local private lease rates and
other local factors.
Base fees established in 1931 were adjusted annually by formulae expressing the relationship between the previous year's average price for beef
cattle or lambs in the western states and prices in established base periods.'
Permittee tenure and security were also issues during
this period. Annual grazing permits, with the associated
uncertainty related to annual permit availability and allowable grazing numbers, presented difficult management problems even in the short run. Establishment of 5-year permits
were part of the fee increase "package" that took shape between 1916 and 1918. Permit tenure was extended to 10. years
sometime during the late 1920's, likely as a result of the reappraisal of public land problems which followed the Rachford investigations.
The livestock industry also sought some degree of program stability and tenure security as protection from vacillation that might occur as different individuals assumed the
office of Secretary of Agriculture. According to Peffer:
7. Rachford, Range Appraisal Report (1924) (unpublished report to U.S.
Department of Agriculture).
8. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPT. OF THE FOREST SERVICE, REP. No.
3, GRAzING FEES ON NATIONAL FOREST RANGE: PAST HISTORY AND PRESENT
POLICY (1969).
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It (the livestock industry) wanted a reasonably definite system upon which to base its operations and did
not want to have to readjust itself every five years,
or more often, to a new edict by the Forest Service or
by Congress . . . the industry felt that it could no
longer base its future on the promises of an official
who might be succeeded at any time by one of opposite view.'
Controversies over the legal status of grazing on the
national forests also generated investigations, hearings, and
considerable emotion. Senator Stanfield's bill proposed establishing grazing as one of the primary purposes for which
the forests were created.
Conservation groups reacted
strongly and entered the debates as active participants. The
Society of American Foresters said,
The effect of the constant contact with grazing as
an industry and as a user of a resource contained
within national forests has produced, . .. a tolerance
for grazing and a desire to adjust it to forest production which in effect has already elevated it to the
dignity of a coordinate use with forestry and an end
in itself."
Other conservation groups argued for complete expulsion of
livestock grazing from the forests and proposed essentially
singular recreation and wildlife uses as prevailed in the
national parks. One should keep in mind that these arguments were being made in the mid-1920's. Competition for
use of public lands is obviously as old as the concerned, organized, vested interests.
Basic Issues of Control
The controversies over fee levels, use priorities, and the
gamut of related problems remained somewhat secondary,
however, to the issue of federal control of public lands, especially public domain lands, in the late 1920's. First, there
were questions of whether these lands should remain in government ownership, be given to the states, or be allowed to
9. PFFIER, supra note 2, at 189.
10. Id. at 195.
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move into private ownership. Second, if they remained properties of the federal government, should the Department of
Interior or the Department of Agriculture administer them?
In 1929, Interior Secretary Wilbur proposed that all
public lands within individual state boundaries, excluding
national parks, national monuments, or national forests, be
given to the states willing to assume management responsibility for the surface rights of such lands. He even suggested that the states might eventually control the present national forests."
President Hoover concurred in the proposal and recommended that a commission be established to
investigate the advisability of turning the remaining public
domain land to the states in which they were located. 2
The reactions revealed the apparent indifference of eastern representatives to these lands. Their reactions ranged
from the position that states should pay for the lands, to one
that the lands were not worth possessing. Neither these representatives nor the general public raised a strong voice to
incure sustained federal ownership. More surprising reactions, however, came from the Western States within whose
borders lay the lands and whose rights to amounts of comparable lands had already been established by their school and
other grants. Most states did not want the lands unless they
Governor Dern of Utah
also received the mineral rights.
expressed the feeling of many western states when he said,
"The states already own, in their school grants, millions of
acres of this same kind of land, which they can neither sell
nor lease, and which is yielding no income. Why should they
want more of this precious heritage of desert?" 3 Conservation groups continued their expressed oppposition to any
move to transfer these lands to state ownership. The movement to give these lands to the states lost its momentum and
eventually ceased. But it is interesting to postulate in this
area of increasing land values and criticism of past land policy (especially state land disposal policy), that a key factor
11. 62 CONG. REC. 3570-71 (1929).
12. Id. at 3572.
13. Hearings on Granting Unreserved Lands to State Before the Senate Comm.
on Public Lands and Surveys, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931-32).
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in the demise of the movement was not the reluctance of the
Western States to prosecute their interests but their outright
opposition to the proposal.
Another issue that was evident during this period, and
which has pervaded discussions of public land policy in all
time periods, is the question of the purpose or objective of
federal land management. The so-called issue of conunercialization of the national forests had already been expressed
in the early 1900's and had drawn considerable opposition.
Evidence persists that the general goal of land management
during subsequent years was to insure the preservation of
those lands that were productive and capable of providing
necessary resources for future generations. In the 1925
Yearbook of Agriculture, the Secretary of Agriculture said:
The Department believes that the production of
livestock has a permanent and valuable place in the
national forests and that every reasonable form of
security should be given the livestock producer in
making the most advantageous use of this public resource. Legislation establishing a permanent place
for grazing in the national forests would be desirable, in order that this important economic service
may be freed from even the remote danger of sudden
and drastic change in the more essential policies
concerning the use of the range.
I favor a provision of law that will authorize
firm contracts or licenses for periods of ten years,
to be binding upon the government as long as their
conditions are met, and under which the requirements to be observed by the range users, possible
reductions in the numbers of livestock, and the provision for grazing fees shall be specifically set forth.
The essential point is that while the users of the
ranges should be given a permanent and definite
status and stabilized as far as possible, this use of
the national forest must be fitted into and harmonized with the entire plan for the conservation of public resources.14
It is interesting to note that conservation of the resource
and stability of the industry were the central themes of this
14. U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 87-89 (1925).
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attempt to recognize the interests of the users and still exert
the fundamental power of the federal agency. Any inference
that the lands had a role in producing revenue for the government or that society was entitled to a full or fair return of
value of obviously absent.
Legislation and Control of Public Domain Lands
Enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 authorized,
for the first time, fee charges on public domain lands administered by the Department of the Interior. Prior to that
time, fee assessments and most debates about public land
policies had centered on Forest Service lands. The Taylor
Grazing Act and its subsequent amendments, might be considered a "landmark" document in public land policy for
several reasons. First, it prescribed the initial user-charges
for public domain lands. Secondly, it defined in more detail than any previous legislative action, the management
functions of the federal agency. Third, it gave legislative
sanction to a philosophy of land management that emphasized the public welfare aspects of land use as opposed to the
philosophy that would promote "commercialization."
In
retrospect it would appear, however, that Congressional intent for the role to be played by public domain lands was essentially unchanged from the role set for Forest Service
lands.
The preamble to the Act set the philosophy that prevailed for more than 20 years: "To stop injury to the public
grazing lands by preventing overgrazing and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, improvement, and development, to stabilize the livestock industry dependent upon
the public range, and for other purposes."1 5
Fee Levels
Authorization to assess grazing fees was given the Secretary of the Interior under provisions and amendments to
section 3 of the Act:
15. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), as amended (codified in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to
issue or cause to be issued permits to graze livestock . . . upon the payment annually of reasonable
fees in each case to be fixed or determined from time
to time, and in fixing the amount of such fees the
Secretary of the Interior shall take into account
the extent to which such districts yield public benefits over and above those accruing to the users of the
forage resources for livestock purposes, ...
So far
as consistent with the purposes and provisions of
this chapter, grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but
the creation of a grazing district or the issuance of
a permit pursuant to the provisions of this chapter
shall not create any right, title, interest, or estate in
or to the lands. 6
One can find little evidence in the language of the Act,
subsequent amendments to the Act, or events of the next 20
years that signal any basic change in the fundamental philosophy of Congress or the government agencies relative to the
intended role of these lands. The Act clearly emphasized
that resource protection, development, and stability of the
livestock industry are to be paramount consequences of the
Act. In addition, it defined that the permit to graze could
not create a right, title, etc., in the lands.
The subsequent amendment of the Act in 1947, seems to
have reaffirmed the so-called "social" aspects of public domain land usage. Under the sponsorship of Representative
Barrett of Wyoming, the following statement was included in
the Act: "and in fixing the amount of such fees the Secretary
of the Interior shall take into account the extent to which such
districts yield public benefits over and above those accruing
to the users of the forage resources for livestock purposes.""
This wording suggests that the users of grazing districts
were not expected to pay the full value of the commodity they
consume. The clause would tend to legalize the grazer's contention that "paying a fee for revenue ... is contrary to the
fundamental principles on which this country was built.'""
16. Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315(b)
17. Id.
18. PEFEMR, supra note 2, at 276.

(1964).
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It might further suggest that Congress intended that the
Secretary should establish fees at whatever levels thought
desirable to maximize the social product of the lands, with
the implied condition that the fees make the program "selfsufficient." In fact, Clawson argues: "The Taylor Grazing
Act was amended in 1947 to state more clearly the principle
that grazing fees were to be based on the cost of administration. 1719
Subsequent attempts to increase fee levels produced debate, conclusions, and individual positions that tend to support this claim as well as the general thesis that the philosophical base of public land goals remain unchanged from
that contained in the Taylor Grazing Act and expressed by
previous agency policies, i.e., non-commercialization.
The initial grazing fees for lands under the Taylor
Grazing Act ($.05 per animal unit month (AUM)) were intentionally kept low to avoid imposing undue financial burdens on the industry during the depression. Fee increases
proposed in the early '40's on the basis that government was
not receiving compensation equal to privately leased lands
met with considerable opposition. "Secretary Ickes is said
to have thrown his weight on the side of the grazers. His
position was that it would be inconsistent to increase fees
while the government was subdizing the industry .""
Senator McCarren of Nevada contended that fees were set
to cover only administrative costs, not the value of the
forage. It is difficult to conclusively document this "pricing" philosophy in the Taylor Grazing Act or in any other
official proclamations of either Congress or the federal agencies. But several conditions suggest the importance of this
idea in the determination of fee levels. First, there is evidence that non-monetary matters were expressly important
to the federal agencies in determing fee levels. Second, statements of individual congressmen suggest their support of
this philosophy. Third, while the Taylor Grazing Act was
being considered, support was given to keeping public domain
19.
20.

& HELD, THE FEDERAL
222 (1957).
PEFFER, supra note 2, at 261.
CLAWSON

LANDS:

THEIR USES AND
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lands under the Department of Interior because cost of
management would be minimal and fees could be kept lower. 1
Fourth, while amended several times since its enactment, the
basic focal point of the Taylor Grazing Act has remained unchanged.
The problems and controversy of public land policy were
not arrested by enactment of the Taylor Grazing Act. Fee
debates continued and fee levels increased. The history of
fee increases during the period 1936-68 is summarized in
Table 1.
Table 1. Interior Department Grazing Fees from 1935-19682
Fee $/AUM
Year
1936-46
1947-50
1951-54
1955-57
1958
1959-60
1961-62
1963-65
1966-68

Cattle
$.05
.08
.12
.15
.19
.22
.19
.30
.33

Sheep
$.010
.016
.024
.030
.034
.042
.034
.060
.066

In 1951, the issue of administrative costs or economic
self-sufficiency of governmental agencies administering public lands was dealt with more directly. Congressional approval was given to the following:
It is the sense of the Congress that any work,
service, publication, report, document, benefit, privilege, authority, use, franchise, license, permit, ceritficate, registration, or similar thing of value or utility
performed, furnished, provided, granted, prepared,
or issued by any Federal agency (including wholly
owned Government corporations as defined in the
Government Corporation Control Act of 1945) to or
for any person (including groups, associations, organization, partnerships, corporations, or business21. Id. at 263.
22. 1969 Hearings, supra note 1, at 6.
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es), except those engaged in the transaction of official business of the Government, shall be self-sustaining to the full extent possible ... "
Regarding the establishment of use fees, Congress said:
and the head of each Federal agency is authorized
by regulations (which, in the case of agencies in the
executive branch, shall be as uniform as practicable
and subject to such policies as the President may
prescribe) to prescribe therefor such fee, charge, or
price, if any, as he shall determine, in case none
exists, or redetermine, in case of an existing one, to
be fair and equitable taking into consideration direct
and indirect cost to the Government, value to the recepient, public policy or interest served, and other
pertinent facts, and any amount so determined or
redetermined shall be collected and paid into the
Treasury as miscellaneous receipts: Provided, That
nothing contained in this title shall repeal or modify
existing statutes prohibiting the collection, fixing
the amount, or directing the disposition of any fee,
charge or price. Provided further, That nothing
contained in this title shall repeal or modify existing
statutes prescribing bases for calculation of any fee,
charge or price, but this proviso shall not restrict
the redetermination or recalculation in accordance
with the prescribed bases of the amount of any such
fee, charge or price.24
But with the effort to deal with the concept of economic
self-sufficiency seemed to ilustrate a growing problem with
this idea. As the government agency took on more and more
functions consistent with the growing concern for implementing the multiple use concept of land management, isolating the costs of administering a particular use such as
grazing became more difficult and Less easily defended. By
1954, the philosophy of fee determination attempted once
again to relate grazing fees to the market prices for the
user's products. According to Foss, in 1954,
The National Advisory Board Council agreed to a
fee system based on the combined prices of cattle
23. Act of Aug. 31, 1951, ch. 376 tit. v., 65 Stat. 290.
24. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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and sheep in the markets of the 11 western states.
If cattle prices averaged $.17 per pound and sheep
$.15 per pound during a given year, the average of
the two, or $.16 in this case, would be the grazing fee
per AUM during the following year. "
In spite of the fact that cattle and sheep prices were implemented into the fee setting system, there is no reference
or inference that the system would result in fees which represent "full forage value." This basic system has prevailed
in the establishing of Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
fees since 1954.
Current Grazing Fee Controversy
The current grazing fee controversy had its inception in
the audit reports of the Comptroller General about 1958.
According to Rader:
These reports noted that different methods were
being used by the various federal agencies to establish fees and that charges made by some agencies
were substantially below what was deemed to be
the market value of public grazing as reflected by
lease rates on private lands. 6
In October, 1959, Representative Aspinall of Colorado
called these reports to the attention of the Department of
Agriculture and urged critical study of the inter-agency fee
policies. An Interdepartmental Grazing Fee Comiittee
with participants from the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, and Interior began investigations concurrently with a
study by Bureau of the Budget personnel.
The Bureau of the Budget report was published in 1964,
and stated principles and guidelines for all federal agencies
in establishing grazing fees. Three fee principles, as enunciated by the report, are of special interest.
25. Foss, The Determination of Grazing Fees on Federally Owned Rangeland,
41 J. FARM ECON. No. 3 (1959).
26. Rader, The U.S. Forest Service-Bureau of Land Managament Grazing Fee
Study-Policy Implications (undated and unpublished report to U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Farm Production
Economics Division).
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First, a uniform basis should be used by all Federal
Agencies in establishing fees. Second, fees should be
based on the economic value of the use of the land to
the user, taking into account such factors such as
quality and quantity of forage, accessibility and
market value of livestock. Economic value should
be set such that the government gets a fair return
and there is equitable treatment to the users. Competitive bidding should be used where feasible or fees
should be set such that they are comparable to fees
charged on comparable state and private rangelands. Third, a lesser amount may be recovered
where full payment would significantly impair a federally-sponsored program.27
(One might suspect that the third point was deemed necessary in light of the extreme clarity of points one and two.)
This statement of principles represented a radical departure from prior philosophies of user-charges as expressed
in the Taylor Grazing Act and elsewhere. Notable by its
absence, except for possible inference in the third point, is
any mention of the concepts of preservation, stability or
social values. The statement is a strong commitment to
extracting full economic values even to the point of initiating
competitive bidding. The statement is provocative in another
respect, not so because of its content, but because of its
source. The Bureau of the Budget had been given or had
assumed a role in clarifying public land user-charge procedures. In the process, they attempted an unprecedented
definition or redefinition of the goals and objectives of public
land policy. The conflicts between the Bureau's statement
and that of the Taylor Grazing Act, are all too obvious. One
might also ask about the Bureau's source of legal authority
and responsibility for making public land policy and f'LO establishing criteria for user-charges. Nevertheless, the Bureau's efforts apparently were instrumental in fostering the
current re-evaluation and study of agency policy on public
lands.
27. U.S. BUREAU
(1964).
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AN E;CONOMIC IMPLICATION OF GRAZING FEES

Throughout the numerous debates and the historical evolution of public land use policy and philosophy, an economic
consequence of some significance has occurred. The permit
to use the public ranges has gradually acquired a marketable
value because of the consistent failure of the government to
seek full forage value through the fee mechanism. The consequence of this well-documented policy, is to place the question of this "intangible" permit value in a central position
as further methods for determining user-charges are debated.
The existence of such an "intangible" and yet real permit
value generates crucial questions for those implicated in the
policy, economic and legal aspects of public land usage.
An Economic Model for Grazing Fees
As part of the investigative work initiated by the Interdepartmental Grazing Fee Committee in the early 1960's, an
economic model was developed to explain how forage is valued on public lands. 8
The basic premise of the model argues that the forces of
supply and demand operate to establish range forage prices
just as they do in any other product market. If this is true,
the value of public and private grazing per AUM should be
the same within given market areas, assuming, of course, that
public and private ranges are substitutes for each other.
The logic of this assertion is as follows:
Each rancher knows about what he can afford to pay for
an additional animal unit month (AUM) of grazing for a
particular season and a given quality forage. If rational and
economically motivated, he would be willing to pay up to
the price that is equal to the value added to ranch production
by the addition of one AUM of grazing. This is referred to
as the marginal value product of grazing (MVP). If we let:
28.

JENSEN & THOMAS, DETERMINING GRAZING FEES ON NATIONAL FORESTS:
RANGE AND RANCH PROBLEMS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR
FUTURE ECONOMIC RESEARCH IN THE USE AND DEVELOPMENT (WAERC

Report No.

9, 1967);

MANAGEMENT

ROBERTS, DISCOVERING GRAZING VALUES,

No. 6, at 369-75 (1967).
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P1 = value of public grazing per AUM
P2=

value of private grazing per AUM

and we assume that public and private grazing are substitutes for each other, ranchers will be willing to pay equal
amounts for the two types of grazing up to the point where:
P1 = P2= MVP. If the administered grazing fee for public
grazing use (Fi) is less than Pi and P2, it is also less than
the MVP of the public grazing.
If F1 is less than the MVP of the grazing, the rancher
who has control of the grazing is realizing a product surplus
value additional to the grazing fee cost. Since control of
grazing is embodied in the grazing permit, the product surplus becomes a marketable item through transfer of the
grazing permit. As ranchers bid for control of the grazing
permits, the authorization to graze public lands takes on
value. This permit value reflects the capitalized surplus
product value and can fluctuate as the supply and demand
conditions change.29
It follows, therefore, that if the public and private grazing have equal value per AUM, the total costs associated with
each should also be equal. The costs of private grazing include the private lease rate plus other user non-fee costs such
as death loss, herding or fencing costs, moving costs, etc.
Public grazing costs include the fee plus user non-fee costs
of the same general classifications as for private grazing. In
both cases, the types and levels of non-fee costs may vary.
The total public grazing cost also includes the grazing permit costs and it is the fluctuation of this cost which should,
in the presence of a competitive market, keep the costs of
public and private grazing eqi ivalent. The postulate can be
advanced therefore that the permit value should be equal
to the capitalized difference between the total cost of public
29. The Forest Service and the BLM have commensuratability requirements
that must be met before a rancher can qualify for a grazing permit. For a
rancher to meet this requirement he must have enough private land resources to provide feed for the permitted livestock while not on the federal
lands. Whether institutional barriers to a free market are significantly
limiting competition has been tested in other areas with different results,
see: GARDNER, Transfer Restrictions and Misallocation in Grazing Public
Range, 44 J. FARM ECON. No. 1 (1962).
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grazing and the total cost of private grazing.
bolically,
P, = (PI + E2) -

i

(F, +El)

311
Stated sym-

(1)

where:
P, = permit value
P2 = private lease rate
E2= other private user non-fee costs
F1 = public grazing fee
E-

public user non-fee costs

i = relevant rate of interest
Given this relationship, it follows that the value of the
public forage is a function of the fee, non-fee costs and the
permit value. Symbolically stated,
V = Fi + k(P,)
where:

(2)

V = value of the public forage with a given fee
system
Fi = public grazing fee
P7 = permit value per AUM
k = capitalization rate
This model was tested empirically in Utah in 1966. It
was found that the cost differential between total public and
private costs, capitalized at about a 4 percent rate of interest,
equalled the average permit value. Four percent was considered a reasonable, and if anything, a conservative rate of
interest. Thus, the conclusion was reached that a reasonable
amount of competition exists given the transfer restrictions
and that a relatively free market exists for public grazing.
If the competitive market does not exist, there is no reason
to expect the capitalized differential between public and
private costs of grazing to equal the average permit value.
A numerical application of the model may help clarify
some points. The data used in this example are from one of
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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the initial summaries of the 1966 Forest Service grazing fee
material. Data were gathered to provide estimates of the fee
and non-fee costs on public and private land and on market
values of grazing permits. Substituting these data into
equation 2:
$25.35 = $5.32 i

$4.26

i = .0418
where:
$25.35 = average permit value
$4.26 = (F, + Ei)

$5.32 = (P2 +

E2)

.0418 = i = capitalization rate
The value of the forage per AUM is:
V = $.51 + .0418 ($25.35)
V = $1.57
where:
V = value of the forage
$.51 = average grazing fee per AUM
.0418 = capitalization rate
$25.35 = average permit value
This means that fee charges should be increased from $.51 to
$1.57 if the government is to realize the full economic value
of the grazing forage.
The obvious relationship between the level of grazing
fccs and the permit valuie has important policy implications.
In general, the model suggests that any conditions that alter
the differential between the cost of public and private grazing would be reflected in changing permit values. Perhaps
of greatest policy concern is the implication that increased
fee levels would produce decreased permit values. In fact,
one would postulate that a fee of $1.57 per AUM would
eliminate the total permit value, assuming all other factors
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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remained unchanged. In fact, it is only at the fee level where
the permit value is zero that the government is getting full
market value. As long as ranchers are willing to pay each
other for the permit the government is not extracting all
of the forage value through the fee.
While the nature of this relationship is important to fee
policy, so is the historical evolution of the permit value. As
early as about 1900, there are indications of a value attached
to grazing permits. And, as suggested earlier, the present
values are a consequence of economic principles implemented
by grazing fee policies that did not historically attract full
market values-policies that have been followed in essentials
from the initial assessment of user-charges. It seems, therefore, that holders of grazing permits issued in the early
years, did realize certain capital gains when permit values
appreciated, based on the added forage value they controlled.
The generation of this capital value resulted from what
might be termed "economic law." The initial permit holders
realized this value because they gained control of public
grazing based on prior use and location of their base properties or water. Present permit holders, however, who paid
current market prices for permits have paid the "full forage
value" through the combination of fee charges and permit
costs.
A critical and central issue of the current fee controversy
depends upon this point. What is the potential effect of
increased fees on the wealth position of present permit holders? Is this impact of legitimate or legal concern to the
governmental agencies?
The importance of the permit value to the users can be
illustrated by two examples. First, the permit's recognized
commercial value is evidenced by its acceptance as collateral
by lending institutions.
Secondly, the Forest Service and BLM permits currently
held by users in the Western United States have an estimated
value of $343 million.3" "Full value" fees would presumably
30. NEILSEN & ROBERTS, POSITION STATEMENT ON CURRENT
SUES AND PROBLEMS

GRAZING

FEE IS-

3 (Utah St. U. Ag. Ecom Series No. 3, 1968).
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impose losses of this magnitude on users in the aggregate.
Ranchers' annual incomes would also decrease by an amount
equal to the increase in grazing fees. In addition, one might
expect secondary community losses due to the multiplier effects associated with rancher incomes. On the other hand,
federal and local county revenues would increase by an
amount equal to the increase in fees. Spending of these
monies in local areas would also have positive secondary effects.
The legality of the permittee's right to the grazing permit and to compensation for losses resulting from public
fee policy is now being resolved at several levels. BLM Director Rasmussen set forth the position of his agency in early
1969:
Giving the permittee credit for the interest on
the permit value in computing fees would recognize
that the permit gives the operator a proprietary interest in the public lands. This is clearly prohibited
by the express provisions of Section 3 of the Taylor
Grazing Act that ....
So far as consistent with the
purposes and provisions of this Act, grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged shall be adequately safeguarded, but the creation of a grazing
district or the issuance of a right, title, interest, or
estate in or to the lands. Court decisions confirm
the fact that the privilege of grazing on public lands
cannot become a property right against the sovereign and is withdrawable at any time without payment of compensation.
He further commented:
The Interior Solicitor has stated that, "To base
the fee on a credit which represents a return on the
market value of a grazing permit as though it were
an interest in land like a lease, is directly in conflict
with Section 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act since it
would recognize what the law prohibits- a proprietary interest in the public grazing lands. The concept of permit value itself represents an appropriation by the holders of permits of a part of the public's equity in the public lands. In the case of privately owned lands, it is the owner of the land who
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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is realizing the return on his ownership equity, as
witnessed by the difference in grazing fees between
privately owned and federally owned lands. To allow the permittees the credit on permit value they
contend for, would be to permit the permittee rather
than the owner of the land, i.e., the public, to realize
the return on the lands' value."
If one accepts the idea that recognition of the permit
value gives the permittee a proprietary interest in or to the
land, it follows that the permit value cannot be allowed under the provisions specified in the Taylor Grazing Act. However, there are differences of opinion on this point. Hooper
defines this "proprietary interest" or "possessory interest"
as a "leasehold interest."
The subject of leasehold valuation is clarified
by an understanding of the bundle of rights theory
in real estate appraisal. Stated simply, when an individual or agency owns real property, the ownership embraces a great many rights such as the right
to occupancy and use, the right to sell, the right to
lease, and other benefits of use associated with ownership. A property owner who leases his real estate
transfers one of the rights in his bundle to the tenant, namely the right of occupancy and use."
The grazing fee issue has already been challenged in the
courts. Two court cases have been heard, one in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Utah, and one in the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico. The New
Mexico case covers all of the points of the plaintiffs and the
decisions were similar. Therefore only the New Mexico case
will be presented in some detail.
Judge Bratton's memorandum opinion contained these
essential points."
The plaintiff, Pankey Land and Cattle Company, attacks the new fee schedule as a violation of
the requirement that grazing fees be reasonable, im31. Hearings on Grazing Fees on Public Lands Before the Subcomm. on Public
Lands of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969).
32.

HOOPER,

POSSESSORY INTERESTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISIONS

CONCERNING

GRAZING FEES (Utah St. Un. Econ. Res. Center Study No. 4, 1968).

33. 115 CONG. REC. S10719 (1969).
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posed explicitly upon the Secretary of the Interior
by the Taylor Grazing Act, 42 [sic] T.S.C. § 315
(b), and imposed implicitly upon the Secretary of
Agriculture by 16 U.S.C.A. § 580 (1). It is claimed
that the new fee schedules, based as they are upon
the fair market value of forage without taking into
account the capital investment in the permit and in
range improvements, are confiscatory and unreasonable.
The plaintiff further argues that, even if the
new fees do not violate statutory mandates and do
not amount to a taking without compensation in
contravention of the Fifth Amendment, the new fees
are still illegal in that they violate the Secretaries'
own regulations.
In answer to all the plaintiff's claims, the defendants, Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior,
point out that the lands involved are committed to
administration by the respective Secretaries and
that each has authority to issue regulations with regard to these lands, subject only to judicial review
for acting illegally or abusing the discretion thus
vested in him. It is asserted that no abuse of discretion or illegal action was involved in failing to
include the capitalized value of the permit as a cost
of.operating on the public lands.
The defendants reply to plaintiff's claim that
the new fee schedule is confiscatory by pointing out
that a permit is not a property right and that its
tenure is uncertain and subject to withdrawal or to
drastic curtailment (in the number of AUM's) at
any time that forage conditions may so require.
Judge Bratton further opinions:
It is the failure to include such an item upon
which plaintiff bases its claims of confiscation, unreasonableness, and alternatively, violation of the
new regulations. While plaintiff's claims are stated
in different manners and are presented with varying
approaches, in reality they are all one basic claim,
namely that the actions of the Secretaries were beyond any discretion committed to them by Congress
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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[sic] and hence contravened the statutory standards
and were illegal.
The provisions of the Taylor Grazing Act and
the enabling Agriculture act must be read together
with the 1952 Act. So viewed, the Secretaries are
directed by Congress to establish fees which must
be reasonable, fair and equitable, taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to the Government,
value to the permittee, the public policy or interest
served, and which fees shall be self-sustaining to the
full extent possible. In addition as, to the BLM
lands, the Secretary shall taken into account the extent to which such districts would yield public benefits over and above those accruing to the users of
forage resources for livestock purposes.
The record clearly indicates that exhaustive
studies and evaluations preceded the fee schedule
changes. The 1966 Western Livestock Survey was a
comprehensive effort. It cannot be said that the
Secretaries did not seek information on which to
base their judgments or that they did not consider
the various policy factors as directed by the Congress.
That in their conclusions the Secretaries do
not agree with one item which plaintiff claims
should have been considered as an element of cost
in operating on the public domain cannot be held as
a matter of law to reflect an action in excess of statutory authority ....

Further, they maintain that to

require the capitalized cost of permits to be included
in cost of operation would automatically freeze the
grazing fees at their present level, prohibiting any
increase based on comparison of costs of operating
on private versus public lands. On the record in this
cause their view cannot be held as a matter of law to
be arbitrary.
The statutes clearly indicate entrustment to the
Secretaries of wide areas of judgment and discretion
in setting fees which would fall within the range of
the various factors which the Congress directed
should be considered. See Secretary of Agriculture
v. Central Roiz Refining Company., 338 U.S. 604
(1950).
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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What has been said is decisive of all the claims
of plaintiff in this case. It has not been shown that
the Secretaries have failed to consider all of the factors as directed by Congress. They have acted within the area of discretion and judgment committed to
them by law in promulgating the new regulations,
see Rigby v. Rassmussen, 275 F. 2d 681 (10th Cir.
1960), and thus there is no legal remedy here available to plaintiff. The relief which it desires can
only be obtained through congressional or executive
channels.
This opinion shall constitute the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Court. A judgment binding on the class represented by plaintiff
will be entered dismissing the actions.
Pankey's attorneys have filed an appeal in U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Denver, Colorado. The
appeal brief states the core issue as follows: "whether federal
administrative agencies which have a measure of rate control may set fees which have a built-in element that will destroy a recognized property value; and whether, despite this
effect, they are immunized from effective judicial review
and remedial action." Several specific legal arguments were
listed in the brief.
Fees which preclude any return on investment in
ranch property are unreasonable and confiscatory.
(1) The Secretaries do not have unfettered power
to impose unreasonable and confiscatory fees without judicial scrutiny and remedy.
(2) The reasonableness of the fees must be independently reviewed by the Court on the basis of their
economic impact upon the affected industry.
(3) Appellees deliberately, unreasonably and arbitrarily ignored a major cost of ranching in setting
fees.
(4) The proposed fees (1.23) will not leave sufficient revenue or equity in livestock ranches to allow
service and repayment of ranch debts.
(5) The proposed fees will not allow a reasonable return on investments in ranch property.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/2
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(6) The proposed fees will not provide a rate of return comparable to that available to ranches using
private lands.
(7) The fees confiscate privately owned range improvements.8 4
About the time that the court cases were being heard,
Congress scheduled hearings on the fee problems. Both the
Senate and House of Representatives Subcommittees on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
held hearings in late February and early March of 1969. An
adequate review of the testimony in these hearings would be
much too long for this paper. However, at least one significant event resulted from the hearings. A resolution was
passed by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
U.S. Senate that
requests and calls upon the Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Agriculture with other officials of the Executive Branch of the government to
undertake and complete not later than December 1,
1969, a comprehensive review of the grazing fee
schedules imposed by the order of January 14, 1969.
Said review shall include consideration of whether
the public interest and equity, as well as the purpose
and intent of the Congress as expressed in the Acts
cited above, are reflected in the criteria and methods88which were used in the setting of said fee schedule.
The Secretaries were directed to respond on this matter
to Senator Jackson, Chairman of the committee. In a letter
from Secretary Hickel to Senator Jackson in response to
the above request, Secretary rickel stated:
The requested review has been completed by this
office. As noted in the resolution, the questions
raised before the committee, considered in connection with the language and legislative history of the
Taylor Grazing Act, cast doubt upon the propriety
of the 1969 fee schedule. They may not have taken
into account consideration of the full purpose and
34. GRAZING FEE INCREASES: WHERE Do THEY STAND TODAY, 51 AM. BEEF
PROD. No. 5 (1969).

35. 115 CONG. REC. S10718 (1969).
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intent of Congress as established in the Taylor Grazing Act and in Title V of Public Law 137, 82nd Congress (65 Stat. 290). "
Secretary -ickel has since placed a one year moratorium on
further fee increases pending issuance of the findings of
the Public Land Law Review Commission. This commission
report is due on June 30, 1970. Secretary of Agriculture
Hardin issued a similar one year moratorium in January,
1970.
The task assigned the two Federal Supervising Agencies
is a difficult one. First, they have been instructed to establish user-charges on an equivalent basis. Secondly, they
are functioning under different enabling legislation and
pressures from various sources, i.e., the Forest Service is
not bound by the Taylor Grazing Act, which does direct the
BLM. Both are being pressured by the Bureau of the Budget, whose role in influencing policy issues is not entirely
clear. Third, they must confront the issue of permit values
and whether a governmental policy that led to the emergence
of economic values that constitute "out of pocket" cash costs
to most permit holders could be legally eradicated or significantly reduced without compensation through a change in
fee policy. Fourth, they are enmeshed in the consequences
of a historical public land policy that has never truly clarified the issues or (especially) the objectives of public land
use.
Hopefully, the court cases currently in process will
generate some basic legal positions of a clarifying nature.
The efforts of the Public Land Law Review Commission
(PLLRC) are now in the spotlight. But in retrospect, one
can only conclude that the ultimate responsibility for clarifyi g t
issues of public land policy rests in the Congress.
It is their action, following efforts of the PLLRC and the
regulatory agencies, that will determine whether or not the
historical controversy about public land usage and usercharges will continue in the same unstructured arena.

36.
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